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“Holocaust,” a sacrifice entirely consumed by fire, has been appropriately accepted 
as descriptive of the cold-blooded undertaking by the German government, 
elaborately planned and ruthlessly and efficiently carried out as long as it was 
possible, to exterminate the Jews and members of some smaller groups, including 
Gypsies, in Germany and the territories that German and allied armies occupied 
during World War II. Before they were overrun by the armies of the USSR and 
the western allies, their officers and agents, who were not all Germans, had 
slaughtered approximately six million Jews and smaller numbers of other groups. 
The facts of this massive campaign of extermination have been irrefutably proved 
by the evidence of intended victims whose time for death had not arrived when 
they were rescued, by soldiers and others who liberated the death camps, by 
evidence given by organizers and participants in the program before the 
international Nuremberg Tribunal, and by masses of documents in which the plans 
and progress of the scheme were carefully recorded by officials of the German 
government. I cannot understand the mental processes, if that is the correct 
phrase, by which individuals profess to have persuaded themselves that this 
monstrous program of extermination did not take place. However, there are 
some, of whom Malcolm Ross appears to be one, who present every outward 
appearance of holding that belief.
According to the findings of the Board of Inquiry that investigated a complaint 
against Ross under the New Brunswick Human Rights A ct,1 he has publicly 
asserted his belief in printed books, in contributions to the press, in a television 
interview, and perhaps in other ways. By these means he has publicly 
disseminated for several years his denial of the occurrence of the Holocaust, along 
with derogatory comments about Jews and Judaism.
He “continuously alleges,” in the Board’s words, that his “Christian” faith and 
way of life are under attack by an international conspiracy in which the leaders of 
Jewry are prominent. He speaks of society in the context of Jewish controlled 
mass media, of Jewish controlled international finance, and of “Jewish-dominated 
Christianity, where every evangelist who appears on television spews out the same 
old line.” He says, “The Jews, are (said to be) God’s chosen people, so we must 
support them in everything they do.”
He believes that many of the evils in our time stem from the fact that “we 
have ... allowed those who hate the Lord to rule over us.” He refers to a great 
Satanic movement which is trying to destroy Christian faiths, and identifies the
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Jews as the “synagogue of Satan.” He encourages others to condemn the Jews 
and throw off the “yoke of Jewish Domination.” “These same themes,” reports 
the adjudicator, “are constantly repeated in his writings which attack the Jewish 
religion.”2 The Board finds that Ross’ writings and comments cannot be 
categorized within the scope of scholarly discussion. Ross’ primary purpose is 
found to be an attack on the truthfulness, integrity, dignity and motives of Jewish 
persons rather than the presentation of scholarly research.
Here I must interject that freedom of expression cannot be confined to the 
product of scholarly research. Nevertheless the Board’s finding is important. 
Ross’ publications appear not to bear even a slight resemblance to the result of 
scholarly research, although they are apparently deceitfully presented under that 
guise. They resemble those of Ernst Zundel and Jim Keegstra, both of whom 
have been tried on criminal charges. As reported, they seem not to be as virulent 
as Keegstra’s teaching, but if not protected by s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of  
Rights and Freedoms3 they might be considered as wilfully promoting hatred 
against an identifiable group, under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code.4
Section 2(b) of the Charter asserts that everyone constitutionally enjoys 
freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press 
and other means of communication. Section 1 subjects this freedom to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.
Clearly, Ross is entitled to hold the beliefs he professes. Two juries found that 
Zundel did not believe in the truth of closely similar statements he published, but 
individuals have believed even more untenable doctrines. It is at least possible 
that Ross believes what he says. Any discussion of his case must proceed on the 
assumption that he does. On that assumption, should he be free to publish these 
beliefs?
As an abstract proposition, such a question would seem prima facie to require 
an affirmative answer. Nothing requires that opinions entitled to Charter 
protection must be true or reasonable or even plausible or sensible. However, in 
this case the question is not simply whether Ross should be free to deny the 
occurrence of Holocaust. This denial cannot be maintained without a vicious 
attack on the honour and integrity of not only the survivors of death camps but
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also of world Jewry, by Ross’ assertion of a world-wide Jewish conspiracy.
Are there reasonable limits prescribed by law that are demonstrably justifiable 
in our “free and democratic” society that would deny Ross the freedom to publish 
his doctrine? There are three criminal offenses that might be applicable.
One, of which Zundel has been convicted, of publishing statements he knew 
to be false that were likely to cause social or racial intolerance, under what is now 
s. 181 of the Criminal Code, is not available here unless it can be asserted that 
Ross knows his statements to be false. As I have said, I must assume that he 
believes them to be true. In any event, I would not be surprised if the offence in 
question fails to stand up under a pending Charter challenge.
In certain circumstances, an accused can be convicted for wilfully promoting 
hatred against Jews under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code for publishing statements 
one believes to be true. However, the offence is narrowly defined. Since the 
Attorney-General of New Brunswick has refused to authorize a prosecution for 
this offence, we can only speculate by analysis on whether it applies here.
Hatred is a strong word. It imports active and malevolent detestation and 
enmity, a violent and venomous emotion. Ross’ utterances could be capable of 
arousing that emotion. Promoting is a purposeful activity. The word “wilfully” 
emphasizes absence of accident, mistake or ignorance of consequences. The word 
in this context has been judicially interpreted to mean intentionally or at least with 
knowledge that hatred is a certain consequence. Here the evidence of common 
knowledge in the community and of hateful behaviour by a small group of students 
against Jewish girls, shows that Ross could not have been ignorant of actual 
incitement of hatred, while he persisted in publishing his doctrine. The language 
of his attacks seems to provide evidence of actual intention to promote hatred.
Of the four statutory defences provided by s. 319, three are clearly unavailable 
to Ross. His statements are patently not true. He has clearly not been attempting 
to remove matters likely to produce hatred against Jews. He cannot claim that his 
motivation has been a discussion for the public benefit. However, he may succeed 
in establishing that he has been attempting in good faith to establish by argument 
an opinion on a religious subject.
Not everything that is said or done in the name of religion is protected by s. 
2(b) of the Charter. In Salvation Army Canada East v. Ontario (Attorney- 
General)5, Henry J. of the Ontario High Court of Justice reviewed authorities on 
this subject. He refused to find that provisions of the Pension Benefits Act of
Ontario6 that impose mandatory obligations on the Army and interfere with the 
Army’s principle that its officers serve God voluntarily, not as employees and not 
under contract, without any right to remuneration or pension, are a forbidden 
infringement on the Army’s freedom of religion. Senior officers of the Army 
asserted that the principle of voluntary service is essential to the faith of its 
officers. Henry J. disagreed. The decisions he considered and found to impose 
limits on the chartered freedom and his own decision are not related to the 
religious elements in Ross’ public statements. Ross’ seem to be, in a perverted 
way, essential elements of what he mistakenly believes to be the Christian religion. 
Even if they were shared with nobody else, they would seem to be an integral part 
of his personal religious belief. If he were prosecuted for this offence, an acquittal 
would not surprise me.
There is also the offence of seditious libel, under ss. 59 to 61 of the Criminal 
Code. On the facts as reported, there seems to be no evidence of a clear and 
present danger of a disturbance of the political or social order or an intention to 
invite such a disturbance necessary to support a conviction for that offence, 
notwithstanding the threatening acts of a small group of students.
We seem to be left with probably no criminally-based limitations on Ross’ 
freedom of expression. In civil law, actions of defamation are not available to 
members of a large group who are not individually identified by the defamatory 
publication. This is unfortunate, for although in present circumstances I believe 
that the offence of wilfully promoting hatred is necessary, I also believe that the 
criminal process and criminal sanctions are not really appropriate for dealing with 
this type of behaviour. The Defamation A ct of Manitoba7 offers a suggestion of 
a possible civil remedy. Under it, the publication of a libel against a race or 
religious creed likely to expose persons belonging to the race, or professing the 
religious creed to hatred, contempt or ridicule, and tending to raise unrest or 
disorder among the people, entitles a person belonging to the race, or professing 
the religious creed, to sue for an injunction to prevent the continuation and 
circulation of the libel. The reference to contempt or ridicule and the requirement 
of a tendency to raise unrest and disorder could be dropped. The classes of 
persons entitled to protection could be extended. Some screening of the right to 
sue might be added. This process would avoid difficulties inherent in 
criminalization of the publication. This remedy would have to be provided by 
provincial legislation.
As it is, we are left with the question of the appropriateness of the proceedings 
under the New Brunswick Human Rights Act. On that issue, I can do no better
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than approve of the reasons for judgment of the Board of Inquiry. Teaching 
involves a relationship between school authorities and their employees with pupils 
in which freedom of expression enjoyed in general society must be curtailed. 
Hateful propaganda such as Ross’ cannot be tolerated in that environment. Even 
though Ross did not directly teach his anti-Semitic doctrine to his classes, I am 
convinced that his obsessive, strongly held and violent beliefs must have coloured 
his teaching of almost any subject. Moreover, his publications and interview made 
his beliefs common knowledge in the community of the school district and had 
disturbing effects.
Some non-Jewish students were stimulated to engage in anti-Semitic acts and 
words. Two Jewish students who gave evidence felt threatened. Ross not only did 
not afford a good role model in the community -  he actively afforded a bad role 
model. Even Alan Borovoy, General Counsel to the Canadian Civil Liberties 
Association, who strongly argues against the existence of the criminal offence of 
promoting hatred, agrees that Ross should not be employed as a teacher while 
propagating his offensive doctrine.8
If I had been a member of the Board of Inquiry, I would have proposed that 
Ross should be dismissed by the School Board on the ground that his continued 
employment in any capacity suggests that his publications enjoy a measure of 
support by members of the School Board. However, I can accept the actual order.
I will not comment in detail on the reasons for judgment or the order. Ross 
was represented by an able, assiduous and aggressive counsel. I am sure that 
nothing that could have been done or said on Ross’ behalf was omitted. Justice 
Creaghan reviewed the proceedings and judgment and upheld them, with the 
exception of the addition of the order against the provincial Department of 
Education and the provision that Ross should be dismissed if he continued his 
anti-Semitic publications.9 It seems to me that the single member of the Board 
of Inquiry has dealt admirably with the issues.
With great respect, I am unable to follow the reasoning that led Justice 
Creaghan to strike out the condition requiring Ross to be dismissed if he 
continued publication. The evidence established, in my opinion, that Ross’ 
continuation in the employ of the Board while publishing his doctrine, and not his 
presence in class, was in itself disturbing and threatening. The Board was publicly 
and widely seen as, if not countenancing, at least tolerating his campaign, 
particularly in revoking its prohibition of publication. The provincial policy 
statement and the Board’s response seem to have been greatly inadequate for
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dealing with Ross’ conduct. His public appearance on television after the restraint 
was revoked suggests that nothing less than actual prohibition, strictly enforced will 
prevent him from continuing his publications. If he does so, I think he should 
enjoy his freedom of expression in other employment.
